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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper develops the concept of corporate strategy as a process of arbitrage between 
markets where asymmetries are exploited by corporate managers.  From a development 
position, this article argues that arbitrage is possible when encountering price asymmetries 
where there is a technical opportunity to realize arbitrage. Examples are taken from Russian 
forestry, construction and mining and car industries reveal how executives can create and 
employ price asymmetries. However the concept of arbitrage can be extended where there 
are, for example, opportunities to exploit differences in health and safety, labour law more 
generally, environmental regulations and knowledge. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper extends the concept of corporate strategy as a process of arbitrage between 
markets (see  Andersson et al 2008) where different nature asymmetries are exploited by 
corporate managers to improve cash ROCE. According to the traditional definition, strategy is the 
course of a company over the long term, seeking an advantage through its configuration of 
resources  and   competences  with  the   aim  of   fulfilling   stakeholder   and   shareholder 
expectations.  There  are  different  types  of  strategic  typology  and  often  these  strategic 
alternatives are labeled generic because theoretically any type of business can implement 
them. 
 
Anderson et al (2008) offer a new perspective on corporate strategy as a ‗process of arbitrage 
between  markets  where  physical,  financial  and  temporal  asymmetries  are  exploited  by 
corporate managers to boost earnings-capacity‘. Also, Ghemawat (2003) notes that the scope 
for arbitrage is the differences that continue  among countries and distances between them 
could be measured by a four-dimensional framework which includes differences in culture, in 
the administrative and institutional context, geography and differences in economic attributes. 
 
This paper increases the scope of arbitrage and proposes that, as an organizing concept, it can 
be  employed to  describe differences that  persist  between regions  of a country.  From a 
development position, this paper considers the extent to which strategy as arbitrage is a new 
phenomenon, are there others forms of strategy as arbitrage? How could strategy as arbitrage 
be employed to understand the process of change in transitive  economies? What creates 
asymmetries and opportunity for arbitrage in transitive economies? This research tries to find 
answers for these questions through the experiences of the transitive economy of Russia. 
 
In this paper we show that arbitrage is possible when two conditions are met: the same asset 
does not trade at  the same price on all markets and there is a technical opportunity of 
realisation arbitrage. Consequently to analyse arbitrage, it is possible to build the matrix with 
two parameters: opportunity and price  differentiation,  and  selects  four  possible options: 
absent price asymmetries and strong potential for arbitrage, absent price  asymmetries and 
weak opportunity for arbitrage, strong price asymmetries and robust opportunity for arbitrage 
and strong price asymmetries and weak opportunity for arbitrage. 
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Examples from the Russian forestry, construction and car industries reveal how executives 
can create price asymmetries and opportunity for arbitrage and use strategy as arbitrage 
getting  a  competitive  advantage.  Also, the paper  shows  the  opportunity  for  exploiting 
asymmetries between high and low level of labour safety cost, labour law cost, environmental 
pollution cost and knowledge cost to boost earning capacity. In addit ion, by disclosing the 
car-maker Avtovaz competition strategy we reveal an additional type of  strategy  - anti- 
arbitrage strategy. 
 
This article  is divided  into three sections: the first of which presents different types of 
strategy typology  and offers a new look on corporate strategy as a process of arbitrage 
between markets where different  types of asymmetries are used by corporate managers to 
increase earnings-capacity. The second section  represents different examples from various 
Russian industries which reveal strategy as arbitrage. In the final section, we use the Avtovaz 
and Nornickel cases to consider, in more detail, arbitrage practice in the large companies that 
disclose a new phenomenon of arbitrage. 
 
 
 
 
2.  Strategy as arbitrage 
 
 
According to the traditional definition, strategy is the direction and scope of an organisation over the 
long term, which achieves an advantage in a changing environment through its configuration 
of resources and competences with the aim of fulfilling stakeholder expectations (Jonson et al 
2006). Also strategy should help to the company find the following questions: Where should 
the company compete?  How could the company achieve and  maintain  advantage?  What 
capabilities, assets, structures and culture do companies need to bring the strategy? How can 
the company change? 
 
There are different types of strategy typology and these strategic alternatives are labelled 
generic because theoretically any type of business can implement them, whether it is a 
mining company, a high-technology firm or a public organisation. 
Influent ial strategy typologies include Simons' strategy model, Porter's competitive strategy, 
Mintzberg's  five Ps and more modern Blue Ocean Strategy. Simon‘s model (Simon 2000) 
analyses the concept of a  company‘s strategy into the four  different areas: strategy as 
process which describes the managerial  activity inherent in influent ial goals; strategy as 
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competitive position which refers to how the company competes in its markets; business 
level strategy which refers to how a company competes in a given business and positions 
itself among its compet itors and corporate level strategy which relates to determining what 
business chooses to compete in and the most effective way of allocating resources between 
business units. 
 
Mintzberg (2002)  describes organisational strategy by using  five Ps: a plan (course of 
action); a ploy (specific maneuver to outwit competitors); a pattern in a stream of actions 
for an int ended strategy to be  realised; a position, that is a means of positioning firms 
within their business environment and a perspective, an ingrained direct ion of perceiving 
things which exist in the mind of managers. 
 
Porter's generic strategies: lower cost, different iation and focus, and five forces analysis 
(1979) are a popular framework for industry analysis and business strategy. The models have 
been derived from theory of industrial organisation economies. According to the philosophy 
of science, there are two processes of  reasoning, namely the deductive and the inductive 
approach which are  important for theory creation and  observation testing (Smith 2003). 
Generally, the deductive approach develops a theory and constructs a  research strategy to 
check the hypothesis. Additionally, this approach is initiated by a research process based on 
existing theory and extended by application of particular predictions which will be verified 
through data collection and findings. 
 
Simons' strategy typology and Porter's competitive strategy were built by using the deductive 
approach because the authors employed different grand range theories as foundation for the 
models. Conversely, the inductive approach collects data and develops a theory as a result of 
a data analysis. Induction is the process whereby the researcher can create a theory by the 
observation of  facts such as  case  studies, data  collection,  survey analysis  of successful 
companies and statistical analysis as part of the inductive process; this approach is widely 
used for building ‗theory of strategy‘. An example could be Funky Business (Nordstrom & 
Ridderstralle 1999) and Blue Ocean Strategy (Kim & Mauborgne 2005). When studying 
which forces are influencing competition and profitability of an industry one can employ both 
of the approaches that will be demonstrated below. 
 
Recently, the new perspective on corporate strategy as a process of arbitrage between markets 
has been created. Arbitrage is one of the popular ideas of modern economics, implementing 
the law of one price and keeping  markets efficient. According to the law of one price in a 
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competitive market, if two assets have equivalent risk and return, they should sell at the same 
price. If the price of the same asset is different in two markets, there will be arbitrager who 
will buy the asset cheaply and sell in the market where it is expensive. In traditional meaning, 
arbitrage involves the simultaneous purchase and sale of the same or analogous security in 
two different markets for profitably different prices and continues until  prices in the two 
markets  reach equilibrium (Sharpe  &  Alexander  1990?).  In addition,  arbitrage  helps  to 
equalise prices and restore market efficiency. 
 
 
Theoretically, arbitrage does  not require capital and risk. However, real world arbitrage 
requires an amount of capital and involves risk. Between 1996 and 1998 there were excellent 
opportunities for covered interest rate arbitrage in Russia. Due to the return from borrowing 
in US dollars, exchanging that currency for Russian rouble and investing in interest-bearing 
instruments such as the Russian rouble treasury bill (GKO), while simultaneously purchasing 
forward contracts to convert the currency back at the end of the holding  period created 
arbitrage profit of about 50 cents per dollar per annum. However, in August 1998, Russia 
defaulted on its internal debt and arbitragers lost capital. This example reveals arbitrage‘s 
risk. Additionally, it shows that profitable arbitrage had to be done in special conditions as in 
the Russian example, exchange  rate  corridor  for  rouble/dollar  being  set  by the  Russian 
government. 
 
Weyly (2007) offers some form of characteristics of markets which are essential to allow 
arbitrageurs to make profits: physical separation of markets; market incompleteness because 
a  market  for  certain  types  of  assets  may  not  exist  in the  absence  of  a  market  maker; 
informational  arbitrage  which  exploit  any  sort   of  information  that  makes  two  assets 
equivalent to one another and creates an opportunity for arbitrage of the segmented markets; 
temporal arbitrage, which use changes in price of assets over time. 
 
Ghemawat (2003) suggests a new look on arbitrage as element of corporate strategy. He 
writes that arbitrage is not cheap capital or labour; the scope for arbitrage is the differences 
that  continue  among  countries.  He  offers  a  four-dimensional  framework  for  measuring 
distance between countries which  includes differences in culture, in the administrative and 
institutional context, geography and differences in  economic attributes. These differences 
from  country  to  country  launch  a  mass  of  strategic  arbitrage  opportunities.  Ghemawat 
emphasizes differences that continue between countries on the contrary one can propose that 
arbitrage also is the differences that keep on between regions of the one country. 
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Anderson et al (2008) reveal corporate strategy as a ‗process of arbitrage between markets 
where physical, financial and temporal asymmetries are exploited by corporate managers to 
boost  earnings-capacity‘.  They  employ  a  wide  definition  of  arbitrage  and  propose  that 
arbitrage is a process consisting of buying and selling on different markets with the intention 
of taking advantage of the differentiation in the price quoted.  In  addition, Anderson et al 
reveal a few types of arbitrage: ‗off-shoring, out-sourcing and transfer pricing arbitrages: off- 
shoring arbitrages high labour costs against low labour costs, out-sourcing arbitrages internal 
settlements against an external supplier where a gradient of difference can be identified and 
captured, transfer  pricing, between geographic subsidiaries, can be employed to arbitrage 
fiscal variations between one region and another reducing the firm‘s effective tax rate and 
lowering the cost of capital‘. 
 
 
One can propose that stable economy and political system has less opportunity for arbitrage. 
In  developed  countries,  market  forces  relatively  quickly  maintain  equilibrium  of  price 
differentiation. In countries with  strong state regulation or with authoritarian regime price 
being regulated by the state and opportunity for  arbitrage is minimal. For example in the 
USSR  arbitrage as  a  legal  business operation was forbidden and  as a result  was  being 
illegally. In transitive countries, generally with weak economic and political  institutions, 
there is significant opportunity for arbitrage which involves using knowledge or confident 
information of future economical and political decision. In addition, there is a large zone 
when political decision makers create opportunities for arbitrage and they are in positions to 
profit from their private investments. In the following sections, strategy as ‗arbitrage‘ will be 
revealed through the experiences of the transitive economy of Russia. 
 
 
 
 
3.  Strategy as arbitrage in Russia 
 
 
 
 
 
As was noted above Anderson et  al reveal three different type of strategy as arbitrage: 
product, labour  and capital market arbitrage which take advantage from the variability in 
price structure between product markets, social settlements governing employment, temporal 
price variations arising from asset appreciation  in capital markets and tax,  interest and 
exchange rate variations through transfer pricing. From a development position, one can set 
additional questions: Is this a new phenomenon in business practice? Are there another types 
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of  strategy  as  arbitrage?  How  strategy  as  arbitrage  could  be  employed  in  transitive 
economies?  And  what  creates  asymmetries  and  opportunity  for  arbitrage  in  transitive 
economies? 
 
We try to find answers to the questions presented in the previous section from Russian 
economic history. It is a trivial fact that the Soviet economy was managed through the State 
Planning  Commission  (Gosplan),  which  had  poor  quality  of  planning  and  insignificant 
reliable feedback; industrial goods and military industry were permanently the focus of the 
Soviet authority and the production of consumer goods was  disproportionately low. As a 
result, there was a scarcity of many consumer goods leading to a widespread black market. 
Some of the black market goods were sold by arbitragers (officially called speculators and 
prosecuted by the state) who exploited price asymmetries. Generally, this arbitrage and 
speculation  were  imminent  within  the  soviet  system  because  they  were  one  of  many 
regulators of economic life. 
 
In 1985, Gorbachev announced the start of the reforms in the Soviet economy which were 
called acceleration, glasnost (liberalisation) and perestroika (restructuring) and the process of 
arbitrage was legalised. Generally, between 1987 and 1992 arbitrage was a major element of 
strategy for new companies because  nobody understood how long perestroika would exist 
and business did not have experience of strategy planning.  Simultaneously arbitrage was a 
major element of operation management due to the collapse of state regulation. Government 
policy and regulation gave a huge opportunity for strategy as arbitrage. For  example,  the 
alcohol reform of 1985 which was designed to fight widespread alcoholism. Prices of alcohol 
were raised, many wineries were destroyed and sales were restricted. Simultaneously there 
was a large disparity  between regions of the country in alcohol supply and demand that 
created price asymmetries and lucky break arbitrage. 
 
Another example could be trading with commodities in the 1990s when there were two 
different prices one price for internal operations within the Soviet Union and a global price in 
Estonia which at that time was within the economic zone of Russia. As a result, in the 1990s, 
this gave a huge opportunity for arbitrage and  resultantly Estonia was the largest world 
exporter of non ferrous metal. 
 
Another example from Russia reveals transfer pricing between subsidiaries, which utilised 
fiscal differences between one region and another, reducing the company‘s effective tax rate. 
After the start of the Russian reforms a few Russian regions created internal offshore zones 
 
7 
that gave opportunities for transfer pricing. The small Russian town Mosalsk, for example, 
where since 1991  had been registered Menatep, one of the largest banks, and the oil giant 
Yukos which were both controlled by M Khodorkovsky. According to Russian tax law these 
companies received large tax privileges, and yet still paid a large share of the town‘s budget 
in corporate tax. Resultantly, the town gained from dramatically increased tax revenue whilst 
the  company  benefitted  from  a  substantially  reduced  taxation  liability  (Osipov  1999). 
Abramovich developed transfer pricing operations and employ price asymmetries. According 
to  the traditional approach, price asymmetries are created by different market nature and 
concrete decision  making,  as a rule,  is eliminated from analysis.  The  Abramovich case 
demonstrates how executives can create price asymmetries. In the 2000‘s Abramovich‘s Oil 
company Siboil which historically was a Russian leader for tax optimization and it sold oil 
through the traders registered in the Russian offshore zones. Abromovich‘s also held the post 
of the governor of Chukotka Region and created, in effect, an ―internal offshore‖ tax haven 
and this according to reports reduced corporate tax more than $2Bn. Using tax  privileges 
Abramovich‘s company could reduce corporate tax from 35 to 5.5% (Finance 2007). 
 
This  last  example  shows that  strategy as  financial  arbitrage  can  include  additional  sub 
strategies such as the creation by the company itself conditions for arbitrage. Generally, it is 
more possible in countries with weak institutional and regulatory bodies such as Russia and 
other countries with transitive economies. 
 
Simplifying, arbitrage is the practice of getting benefit of a price differential between two or 
more markets and it is possible when two conditions are met: the same asset does not trade at 
the same price on all markets and there is a technical opportunity of realisation arbitrage. In 
this case two parameters determine arbitrage: a price differential and a technical opportunity. 
In the traditional understanding, arbitrage is the act of buying a product in one market and 
selling it in another for a higher price and it has to take place concurrently to avoid exposure 
to market risk and therefore arbitrage as financial practice has dramatically grown together 
with the progress of telecommunication which gives the technical opportunity for realisation 
arbitrage. 
 
To analyse arbitrage, it is possible to build the matrix with two parameters: opportunity and 
price differentiation, and selects four possible options: absent price asymmetries and strong 
potential  for  arbitrage  (option  1),  absent  price  asymmetries  and  weak  opportunity  for 
arbitrage (option 3), strong price asymmetries and robust opportunity for arbitrage (option 2) 
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and strong price asymmetries and weak opportunity for arbitrage (option 4).
1     
Fig1 shows 
matrix price asymmetries – opportunity with the four outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
Fig1 Matrix price asymmetry and opportunity. 
 
 
 
 
 
Absent price asymmetries and 
 
strong potential for arbitrage 
 
Option 1 
Strong price asymmetries and 
 
robust opportunity for arbitrage 
 
Option 2 
Absent price asymmetries and 
 
weak opportunity for arbitrage 
 
Option 3 
Strong price asymmetries and 
 
weak opportunity for arbitrage 
 
Option 4 
 
 
 
Source: author 
 
 
Option 2 is the standard case of arbitrage and it was analysed above, option 3 could not give 
arbitrage therefore only two options are interesting for analysis business strategy. Option 4 is 
the typical case which  determines state and regional regulation, bureaucratic barriers and 
limitation of infrastructure of the country and region. Often these determinants are positive 
because they protect ecological and economic interests of the country but often they have 
strong negative intensions. 
 
An example could be the Russian forestry industry. China is the biggest market for wood 
products, which  has fueled import growth, including a considerable quantity from Russia. 
Not  surprisingly there is forest  cutting carried out with abuse of the existing legislation 
however the major part of the cutting in the east  part of Russia was made with official 
permits  for  cutting  operations.  Russian  wood  log  imports  in  China  are  very  attractive 
arbitrage but are limited by a weak opportunity for the increase of supply due to Russian state 
legislation. 
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That is why many forestry companies created many opportunities for cutting. This was done 
by obtaining permits for felling in specially protected natural areas where cutting is forbidden 
or without a genuine  assessment of the volume of wood available for cutting, obtaining a 
permit to cut and transport the wood using relatively non-invasive technology but then using 
cheaper,  more  primitive  methods;  by  exploiting  cutting  permits  established  on  dubious 
interpretations of forest management laws and regulations and by exaggeration of the degree 
to which a forest is afflicted with pests or diseases, so that immediate selective or clear felling 
is necessary, as a result, about 40% of Russian softwood log imports were of dubious origin. 
(Morozov 2000). This example shows how a weak opportunity for arbitrage was strengthened 
and combined with strong price differentiation, strategy as arbitrage was created. 
 
The Option 1 (strong price asymmetries and robust  opportunity for  arbitrage) gives the 
opportunity to create arbitrage by the way of organisation special conditions. An example of 
this option is the employment of migrant workers in Moscow and other Russian cites when 
the construction industry, having had potential for labour arbitrage, lobbied for special state 
resolutions to allow the employment of migrants. According to the  report Human Rights 
Watch (2008) there were 9 million migrant workers in Russia, 80 percent of whom come 
from  nine  countries  of  the  CIS  with  which  Russia  maintained  a  visa-free  regime. 
Approximately 40 percent of migrant workers have been employed in the highly unregulated 
construction industry and two million of them work in the Moscow region. 
 
Generally, migrant construction workers are young men, who leave their family in their home 
countries and enter Russia for six to nine months of seasonal employment, often for many 
years in a row. These workers enjoy higher wages in Russia and often send money to their 
families. Building workers usually live in deprived conditions and often employers commit 
violations of Russian law such as: confiscating passports,  withholding wages and forcing 
employees to work long hours. The absence of a written employment  contract  also leaves 
migrant workers vulnerable in cases of workplace accidents because workers cannot access 
state-sponsored  accident  insurance  that  depends  on employer  contributions  for  all  legal 
employees and in many cases employers do not provide any assistance to injured workers 
(Ibid). 
 
This example shows the well-known type of economic arbitrage which exploits low-cost 
labour as a  reaction to growing competition in markets and huge demand. However, the 
Russian model of off-shoring arbitrage is dissimilar to that observed elsewhere. Russian 
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business transfers labour from developing countries to the relatively more developed Russia. 
More generally,  off-shoring transfers capital and technology from advanced economies to 
developing economies with lower labour costs. 
 
In addition, this case reveals two complementary advantages for companies moving to 
emerging  markets: undeveloped health and safety regulations and labour law. Health and 
safety  compliance  is  very  expensive  in  manufacturing  but  often  ignored  in  developing 
countries. As a result, relocation into countries with more lenient health and safety regulation 
can create reduced operational expenditure. Labour law in developing and transitive countries 
in comparison with developed countries does not provide adequate terms  of employment, 
anti-discrimination,  unfair  dismissal and  child  labour  protection.  Also,  trade  unions  are 
usually   not   independent   of  executives   of  companies,   reducing   union   effectiveness. 
Consequently,  companies  conducting  business  in developing  countries  can often  reduce 
effective labour costs. 
 
In the global market generally, environmental expenditure has been increasing and there are 
significant differences in environmental standards and control systems between transitive and 
advanced   economies. Multinational companies are arbitraging environment costs, 
relocating domestic operations into countries with low environmental standards and/or 
countries with undeveloped monitoring systems in order to take advantage of international 
differences in pay for pollution.  Finland, for example, with a strong paper industry having 
had huge forest reserves, encountered logging limitations from the state due to environmental 
standards. As a result of Finnish policy since the 1990s, round wood exports from the North- 
West of Russia to Finland had doubled from 4-6 million cubic meters per annum in 1982- 
1993 to 10-11 million cubic meters per annum and this export generated a considerable 
deficit  of raw  materials  for  Russian paper  companies (FAO 2002). In the same period, 
Finland increased its production of pulp and paper two-fold whereas the Russian share in the 
world market reduced more than two thirds.  Logging dominated the structure of Russian 
forest exports because the industry had inadequate wood processing in an immediate vicinity 
of wood growth. Finland used the Russian forestry industry solely as a raw material supplier 
(European forest sector outlook study 2005). 
 
In the next section, we consider two cases: Avtovaz and Nornickel. These cases demonstrate 
strategy  as  arbitrage  in  action  and  question  the  extent  to  which  earnings  capacity  is 
transformed. 
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4.  Company Cases 
 
 
 
 
 
Avtovaz 
 
 
 
 
 
Avtovaz was the largest Russian firm that built and assembled cars from parts sourced within 
Russia and its satellite countries. Significantly, the company built approximately 750,000 cars 
each year before its privatisation and was a major supplier of cars to Russian consumers. It 
employed roughly 125,000 employees and was generating a 20% return on capital employed. 
In 1990s, Russia had a comparatively underdeveloped car market and according to official 
statistics market penetration was at 83 cars per 1,000 people, considerably lower than that in 
other European markets (ASM 1995). This factor created a huge demand for cars and price 
asymmetries between domestic and external markets because national manufactories did not 
have adequate  capacity and the quality of cars could not satisfy consumers. Consequently, 
numerous small companies and  entrepreneurs employed opportunities for arbitrage and in 
1996 there was colossal growth in foreign second hand motor vehicles which rose to 457,000 
(about 50% of the market) which was a serious threat to the domestic automotive industry 
and for Avtovaz in particular (ASM 1997). In order to stop the significant growth of used-car 
imports Avtovaz  lobbied the government  to  create a programme to  encourage domestic 
production of cars and increase tariff on used cars by 35% to protect the domestic producers 
from inexpensive used-car imports. 
 
This  case  reveals  two  outcomes:  on  the  one  hand  it  demonstrates  again  strong  price 
asymmetries and robust opportunity for arbitrage (Option 2) in an undeveloped market and 
on the other hand it shows a  strategy of defense against arbitrage which is employed by 
opponent(s). This example clearly discloses the  Avtovaz competition strategy – increasing 
the trade barrier for foreign producers. 
 
Employing matrix ‗price asymmetries – opportunity‘ gives a new opportunity for strategic 
analysis. In the  context of arbitrage, the strategy of Avtovaz was the transference of the 
company‘s opponents position from option 2 to option 4 and as result of this movement it had 
been decreasing opportunities for arbitrage. Also as the second company sub-strategy could 
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be the movement itself from option 2 to option 1 (the absence of price asymmetries and 
strong potential for arbitrage): by increasing capacity, improving quality and optimising car 
price; consequently decreasing  price asymmetries and eliminating arbitrage. The history of 
Avtovaz shows that the company maintained competitive advantages for 10 years by using 
anti-arbitrage strategy. 
 
In that time, however, the competition in the Russian car market had been getting stronger. 
Despite  high  duties,  which  were  reducing  demand  for  second-hand  foreign-made  cars, 
Avtovaz  could  not  save  its  position  because  growth  of  the  national  economy  shifted 
consumer preferences toward new foreign-made cars of the low and average cost segments. 
Since 2000 all major world car manufacturers paid increased attention to the Russian market 
and by the end of 2002 there were already six foreign car assembly operations in Russia such 
as Ford, General Motors, Kia,  BMW and Renault. (ASM 2003). 
 
The Russian new cars market steadily posted solid rates of growth throughout the 2003-2007 
period. Additionally, after years of protecting the domestic car industry through prohibitive 
tariffs, the government reduced the duty on imported auto components to virtually zero. This 
motivated the world‘s car producers to significantly increase production facilities in Russia. 
In the struggle for Russian customers, foreign companies  used all possible trade methods: 
building car assembly plants in Russia, offering consumer credit on a wider scale, improving 
and developing dealer networks, selling new models in the Russia market simultaneously 
with sales in markets of Western countries and using wide, aggressive marketing. In 2007, 
the total sales of new passenger cars constituted 2,000,000 units and the domestic cars made 
up only 30% of them (ASM 2007). Generally, in that time Avtovaz maintained its volume of 
production,  which  fluctuated  between  600,000   and   700,000,  although  the  company 
dramatically decreased its market share from 50% to 24%. The  financial capacity of the 
Russian market was growing faster than the volume indexes of sales. The Russian new cars 
market generated total revenues of $24.6 billion in 2007, representing a compound annual 
growth rate (CAGR) of 31.3% for the period spanning 2003-2007 and market consumption 
volumes increased with a  CAGR of 19.7%. The company increased sales from $3.3Bn to 
$5.1Bn but the share of LADA by financial volume had been decreased from 32% to 20% 
because it could not make up the expensive models and maintained position only in the 
cheapest market niche. 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
2006
 
2006
 
2005
 
2005
 
2004
 
2004
 
2003
 
2003
 
2002
 
2002
 
2001
 
2001
 
2000
 
2000
 
1999
 
1999
 
1998
 
1998
 
1997
 
1997
 
1996
 
1996
 
1995
 
1995
 
V
al
u
e
 r
et
ia
n
ed
 i
n
 i
n
co
m
e 
L
a
b
o
u
r 
sh
ar
e 
o
f 
v
al
u
e 
re
te
n
ti
o
n
 
Chart 1 Avtovaz value retained in income 
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Note: Value retained in income can be determined as sum of EBITDA and labour cost divided into sales 
revenue. 
 
 
 
Chart 2 Avtovaz labour share of value retention 
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Note. Labour costs share of value retained is defined as personnel costs divided by operating result before 
depreciation and amortization plus personnel costs. 
 
Source: Author calculation. 
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Chart 3 Avtovaz ROCE 
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Note: ROCE is defined as operating result before depreciation and amortization in relation to the sum of equity and 
long-term debt. 
 
Source: Author calculation. 
 
 
The problem facing Avtovaz during the 1990s was its increasingly weak finances driven by 
wealth extraction, poor operating finances and weak strategy where the anti-arbitrage struggle 
against foreign producers of new and used cars was the major element of corporate strategy. 
This story reveals a limitation of employing strategy as arbitrage and/or anti-arbitrage if these 
strategy  employed  are  independently  of  alternative  strategies  and  do  not  support  other 
elements of corporate management. 
 
 
 
 
Nornickel 
 
 
Norilsk Nickel was one of the biggest mining companies in the world and manufactured and 
marketed  nonferrous and ore consumer products across the global market. The company 
produced approximately  half  of the world's platinoid and 20% of its  nickel,  employing 
roughly 120,000 employees. Moreover, Nornickel was an unusually well-balanced company 
because it did not experience problems with energy  and  raw materials due to the large 
regional gas field and sufficient ore reserves for hundreds of years of strong demand. Despite 
many financial and political crises of Russia, the company maintained stable production 
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during 1989-2007 and  it  produced 220,000 tonnes of nickel,  410,000 tonnes of copper, 
 
4,500,000 oz palladium and 670,000 oz of platinum per annum. 
 
 
Norilsk Nickel sales revenue growth was 800 per cent in the years 1994 to 2007 and in 2007 
net sales reached $16 Bn; the market capitalization of the group grew more than 25,000% and 
reached $41 Bn. These results are  mainly explained by the boost in the average price of 
metals  because in physical terms,  its sales  amounted to  a relatively constant  level. The 
decisive factors that influenced the world prices for the main  products of Norilsk Nickel 
between  2002  and  2007  were  continued  growth  in  China,  strong  demand  from  major 
developed economies and increased impact on the metal markets of the operations conducted 
by international investment trusts. 
 
There was only one three-year period of time (1996-1998) when the company had a deficit 
cash flow from operating activities. This was due to a dramatic growth of resources cost, a 
relatively low price of metals and a massive withdrawal of capital by the owners. Since 1999, 
the trend of cash flow from operating and financing activities increased more than tenfold and 
reached the company‘s record of $14 Bn. 
 
Chart 4 Nornickel cash from operating activities 
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Source: Nornickel annual reports. 
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The company operated under extreme weather conditions in the Taimyr Peninsula above the 
Arctic Circle where labour and social cost have been much higher than in other regions of 
Russia.  Therefore  Nornickel   increased  the  share  of  its  manufacturing  capacity  and 
employment in low labour cost regions of Russia as well as Africa. Also, between 1997 and 
2003 Nornickel reduced employment levels by about 3-5% per annum and expenditures on 
maintaining the social infrastructure of the town and the region. Nornickel increased the share 
of physical manufacturing capacity located in more desirable parts of Russia arbitraging the 
price difference between original manufactories in the Taimyr Peninsula and other Russian 
labour markets, to make stronger operating financials. 
 
Figure 2 reveals the share of sales revenue retained in Nornickel after paying external costs to 
suppliers. Between 1994 and 2007, this ratio fluctuated around 50% and the first nadir of the 
ratio (1996-1997) was  created by low profitability of business, high expenditure for raw 
materials and substantial amount of the  withdrawn capital by the owners. Since 1997 this 
index has rising trajectory and during 1999 it reaches a  local zenith of 62% due to the 
Russian crisis. 
 
 
 
 
Chart 5 Nornickel value retained in income 
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Note: Value retained in income can be determined as sum of EBITDA and labour cost divided into sales 
revenue. 
 
Source: Author calculation. 
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Chart 6 Nornickel labour as share value retained 
 
 
1.00 
0.90 
0.80 
0.70 
0.60 
0.50 
0.40 
0.30 
0.20 
0.10 
0.00 
 
 
 
 
Note. Labour costs share of value retained is defined as personnel costs divided by operating result before 
depreciation and amortization plus personnel costs. 
 
Source: Author calculation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 shows that  by 2007, the share of labour  costs  in value retained  had  declined 
considerably, in  line with the progressive shift in the share of manufacturing facilit ies into 
other locations and reducing employment levels. This, combined with the strong sales growth 
had an exceptional effect on operating cash  flow. The combination of a reduced share of 
external costs and a lower share of labour costs boosted the value retained in income from 30 
per cent in 1996 to 75 per cent in 2006. 
 
After 1998, the company was completely controlled by Potanin and Prokhorov (about 60% of 
the shares). As a result the executives decreased the proportion of the withdrawal of wealth 
that was used to purchase company shares and the new corporate vision and the new strategy 
were created. The demand of the financial markets, and a new opportunity for shareholders 
pushed the company to  financialization of strategy. The new  strategy of Nornickel was 
focused on increasing shareholder value, holding leading positions on the world market in the 
production of its key products; improving its corporate governance to international standards 
and  the transparency of the company. Also, it was focused on the increase of production 
metals from the company‘s own ores, involvement of stale raw materials into conversion 
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process,  development  of  production  of  metals  from  crowbars  and  waste  products  on 
production facilities of Kola Peninsula, increasing direct sales to foreign producer-processors. 
 
According to the corporate strategy, in 2003-2005, the largest American producer of platinum 
Stillwater, OM Group and Canadian Lion Ore were acquired by Nornickel.   As a result, it 
received good quality mining assets in Western Australia, Finland and Africa and the Russian 
share of the business declined from 98% to 78%. Through these acquisitions, total production 
of Nornickel increased to 300 thousand tons of nickel annually; the acquired companies in 
Africa had cheaper labour cost. Additionally, the purchase of OM Group and Lion Ore gave 
new know-how and technology so production of nickel and could potentially yield savings of 
about  $500 million a year. The last  fact reveals a new type of arbitrage – arbitrage of 
knowledge which exploits asymmetries knowledge due to the creation of know-how and new 
technology by the company  itself could be more expensive than the acquisition of another 
company with special expertise. 
 
Additionally, for the establishment of reliable transportation of cargo passing through the 
North Sea Route the company acquired shipping and transport companies (Archangelsk Sea 
Port  (35.05%  of  shares)  and  Enisey  River  Navigation  (23.8%  of  shares))  as  well  as 
purchasing icebreakers and a reinforced container ship, able to move through ice. In order to 
maintain reliable energy supplies to Nornickel and to optimize  electric power costs, the 
company  increased  its  share  in the  Russian electric  power  industry,  controlled  regional 
electricity suppliers and developed the new Pelyatka condensed gas field. One can suggest 
that  all  these projects are elements of strategy as arbitrage which exploits asymmetries 
between different shipping and transport companies and power supplies. Also, the increasing 
of vertical integration by acquired power and  transport companies additionally reduced the 
share of external costs. 
 
After the 1990s the company rapidly became one of the major suppliers for the European 
market. The  company supplied approximately half of the world's platinoid and 20% of its 
nickel.  (Nornickel  AR  2000-2006).  As  part  of  the  company‘s  foreign  market-oriented 
distribution policy,  Norilsk  Nickel  Europe  Limited  (UK),  Norilsk  Nickel USA,  Norilsk 
Nickel  Asia  and  other  companies  were  created  by  the  company  and  these  companies 
distributed products to the global markets. 
 
The complex structure of marketing divisions abroad helped to adjust earnings capacity of the 
company  by  establishing  transfer  pricing  between geographic  subsidiaries  and  exploited 
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fiscal variations between Russia and other countries reducing the company‘s customs and tax 
payments. Table 2 reveals the differentiation between Nornickel‘s contract prices of copper 
and nickel and prices of these metals at the London Metal Exchange (LME). One can see that 
reduction of export income for the two metals  fluctuated between $58 million and $343 
million and the share of reduction of export income in cash from operations declined from 
34% in 2002 to 6% in 2006. 
 
Table 1 Difference between contract prices of exported metal and prices at the London stock 
exchange of metals 
 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Contract price copper $/ tonnes 1515 1405 1628 2644 3476 6193 
LME price copper $/ tonnes 1578 1559 1779 2866 3679 6722 
Price difference $ 3.96 9.82 8.45 7.72 5.51 7.87 
Export copper 000 tonnes 378 311 267 236 252 169 
Reduction of export income $Mn 23 48 40 52 51 89 
Contract price nickel $/ tonnes 5561 5994 8779 12805 13422 21689 
LME price nickel $/ tonnes 5945 6772 9629 13823 14744 24254 
Price difference $ 6.45 11.45 8.83 7.36 8.96 10.57 
Export nickel  000tonnes 91 160 132 122 125 99 
Reduction of export income $Mn 35 124 113 128 165 254 
 
 
 
Source: Katsik et al 2008 
 
 
Between 1948 and 1975, the company accumulated huge reserves of Platinum Group Metals 
(PGM) bearing tailings because old-fashioned technology of nickel production did not absorb 
PGM and they utilized it as waste  materials. Consequently, the company had accumulated 
approximately 76Mn tonnes of tailings, grading about 7.9 gram/tone (g/t) (5.8g/t palladium, 
2.1g/t platinum) and this containing about 19.3Mn ounces of PGMs. Therefore, developing 
the tailings project was a key production strategy of the company and in 2001, an enrichment 
factory for lifting up and conversion of pyrrotine concoction was built. The exploitation of 
cheap raw materials is type of economic  arbitrage which created enormous profit for the 
company. 
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The company had a close relationship with Russian authority and in 1997 the company‘s 
major owner Vladimir Potanin was appointed vice-premier of the Russian government and he 
used his authority to lobby  the  special government solution № 254 which permitted the 
company to write off about $280Mn in tax debt to the region and to postpone payment to the 
federal budget of $145Mn for 10 years and the state pension fund of $260Mn and $350Mn 
for 5 and 10 years respectively (Butrin 2004). Also the strong economical and social position 
of the company provided total political control of the region and it helped general director of 
Nornickel Aleksandr Khloponin to win the election for Governor of Taimyr Region in 2001. 
The new governor changed the distribution regional taxes and the major part of them used for 
social, ecological and infrastructure programmer of company. 
 
These  examples  demonstrate  how  executives  of  the  company  created  arbitraged  fiscal 
differentiation  between the  Norilsk  region  and  other  regions  of  Russia  and  as  a  result 
sufficiently reducing the company‘s effective tax rate. Also these example reveal that strategy 
as  financial  arbitrage  can  include  additional  sub  strategies  such  as  the  creation  by  the 
company  itself  conditions  for  arbitrage  that  align  with  the  matrix  price  asymmetries  – 
opportunity (The Option 1). Reminder, the Option 1 (Fig 1) gives the opportunity to create 
arbitrage when there is strong potential for arbitrage and absent price asymmetries but which 
could be created by the way of organisation special conditions. 
 
As was noted above since 2000 the company strategy has been finacializated and one can say 
that  financialization has became directing strategy for value creation and value absorption. 
An example of value creation could be the termination of PGMs law. The information on the 
sales  of  PGMs  produced  by  Nornickel  in  Russia  was  subject  to  state  confidentiality 
legislation and its exports were subject to quotas and completely dependent on the Ministry 
of Finance and the State Treasury. However, in 2004, Potanin lobbied for the termination of 
this law. As a result of changes in the legislation, the company was allowed to disclose the 
reserves,  production,  sales  and  consumption  of  PGMs  and  this  rapidly  increased  the 
capitalization of Nornickel.  Disclosing  information about  reserves, production, sales and 
consumption of PGMs are thus a type of knowledge market arbitrage for the reason that it 
exploits  the  difference  between  the  historic  and  current  knowledge  which created  huge 
growth of company capitalisation. The second  example of financialization of strategy is 
purchasing about 10% of shares by the company for treasury stock in 2005 and this helping to 
boost earnings per share and share price. Share buy-backs are thus a form of capital market 
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arbitrage because they exploit the difference between the historic and current market value of 
a firms shares when exchanged. 
 
Figure 4 shows cash ROCE which has a moderately a cyclical pattern and the average ROCE 
placed at about 28%, that was a more than the average levels of Russian companies included 
in the Russian stock market index RTS. In 2002 ROCE reaches its a minimal levels, and after 
it rapidly recovers to 50% level (2006) because of financialization of strategy and growth of 
sales revenue which generated huge profit margins. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Nornickel return on capital employed 
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Note: ROCE is defined as operating result before depreciation and amortization in relation to the sum of equity 
and long term debt. 
 
Source: Author calculation. 
 
 
 
 
 
It so difficult to determinate a transparent connection between arbitrage opportunities and 
financial  gains  of   Nornickel  due  to  a  financial  model  of  the  company  consolidates 
transactions from various markets. 
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5.  Discussion and conclusion 
 
 
This paper has studied the concept of corporate strategy as a process of arbitrage between 
markets  where  different  nature  asymmetries  are  exploited  by  corporate  managers.  This 
concept  is a relatively new  for  economics and  business practice therefore the  inductive 
approach has been useful for developing the theory of arbitrage. Also, the scope for arbitrage 
traditionally includes the differences that continue among countries but we have shown that 
opportunity for arbitrage could comprise the differences that exist between regions  of one 
country and the level of the differences depends on size of the country, political system and 
institutional variation in the culture and geography of the country. 
 
Conditions  within  the  country,  deficit  of  modern  economic  and  political  institutions, 
regulatory policy  framework and non-transparency were paramount factors in determining 
the strategy and influencing outcomes from privatisation in relation to economic productivity 
and welfare in Russia. Also all these factors formed and maintained price asymmetries and 
opportunity for arbitrage in different segments of national economy. 
 
Additionally, the period reforms was characterised by an enormous level of inflation, a huge 
migration  from  eleven  members  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States,  a  large 
differentiation in living standards and wages between Russia and CIS countries as well as 
between Russian regions and increasing of the share of tax in GDP. These factors formed and 
maintained price asymmetries and opportunity for different types of arbitrage in the Russian 
economy. 
 
Historical examples from Russia reveals that arbitrage as element of business practice has not 
been a new phenomenon because arbitrage was imminent within the Soviet system and it was 
one of many regulators of economic life. Also examples from Russia reveal transfer pricing 
between  subsidiaries,  which  utilise  fiscal  differences  between  one  region  and  another, 
reducing the company‘s effective tax rate. The example  shows that strategy as financial 
arbitrage can include additional sub strategies such as the creation, by the company itself, of 
conditions for arbitrage. Generally, this type of arbitrage is more possible in countries with 
weak institutional and regulatory bodies such as Russia and other countries with transitive 
and developing economies. 
 
In this paper, it has been shown that arbitrage is possible when there are two conditions: the 
same asset does not trade at the same price on all markets and there is a technical opportunity 
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of realisation of arbitrage. Consequently to analyse arbitrage, a matrix with two parameters is 
built:  those  of  opportunity and  price  differentiation,  selecting  four  possible  options  for 
arbitrage. Examples from the Russian forestry, construction and car industries have revealed 
how executives can create price asymmetries and opportunity for arbitrage and use strategy 
as arbitrage getting a competitive advantage. 
 
Also the paper has revealed some complementary advantages for companies moving to 
emerging  markets and exploiting asymmetries between high and low level of labour safety 
cost, labour law cost,  environmental pollution cost and knowledge cost to boost earning 
capacity. In addition, by disclosing the car maker Avtovaz competition strategy we reveal an 
additional type of strategy - anti-arbitrage strategy. 
 
We use Nornickel cases to consider in more detail arbitrage practice in the global company 
which disclose a new phenomenon of arbitrage. The company adjusted the share of physical 
manufacturing capacity located in  more comfortable parts of Russia arbitraging the price 
difference between original manufactories in the Taimyr Peninsula and other Russian labour 
markets.  Also  the  company  has  demonstrated  arbitrage  of  knowledge  which  exploits 
asymmetries knowledge because the creation of know-how by the company itself could be 
more expensive than acquisition another company with special expertise. In addition, the 
company has exploited asymmetries between different shipping and transport companies and 
power  supplies  and   vertical  integration  by  acquired  power  and  transport  companies 
additionally reduced the share of external costs. 
 
The complex structure of marketing divisions abroad helped to adjust the earnings capacity of 
the company by establishing transfer pricing between geographic subsidiaries and employed 
fiscal variations between Russia and another countries reducing the company‘s customs and 
tax payments. The demand of the financial markets and a new opportunity for shareholders 
pushed the company to financialisation of strategy as a result the new strategy was focused 
on increasing shareholder value. For that reason, the company lobbied the  termination of 
PGMs law and disclosing information about reserves, production, sales and consumption of 
PGMs. Also the company purchased about 10% of its own shares for treasury stock in 2005, 
helping to boost earnings per share and share price. Share buy-backs are, therefore, a form of 
capital market arbitrage because they exploit the difference between the historic and current 
market value of a firms shares when exchanged.  It  is difficult to determinate a transparent 
connection between arbitrage opportunities and financial gains of Nornickel because the 
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financial model of the company consolidates transactions from various markets and unclear 
of many financial operations of the company. 
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